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11 Introduction
The standard model of decision making describes choice behavior as the outcome of the
maximization of some binary relation, possibly summarized by a utility function. Yet
often observed choice behavior is incompatible with this model1. With this motivation,
in this paper we study and test a class of boundedly rational models of decision mak-
ing which rely on sequential eliminative heuristics. We formalize two sequential decision
procedures, both inspired by plausible models popular among several psychologists and
marketing scientists. However we follow a standard ‘revealed preference’ economic ap-
proach by fully characterizing these procedures by few, simple and testable conditions on
observed choice. Then we test the models (as well as the standard utility maximization
model) with experimental data. We ﬁnd that the large majority of individuals behave in
a way consistent with one of our procedures, and inconsistent with the utility maximiza-
tion model. Our theoretical results also allow us to trace the observed departures from
maximization to either of two elementary forms of inconsistency, and therefore to guide
the search for any alternative model.
For the moment let us refer to our procedures as Procedure I and Procedure II.2 For an
informal example of these procedures, suppose a decision-maker (DM) has to choose which
of three wines to drink with his dinner at a restaurant: a moderately priced Australian
(A), an expensive French Bordeaux (B), or a cheap Italian Chianti (C). Procedure I
describes considerations of the following kind. DM looks ﬁrst at the origin: he thinks B is
best among European wines, so he prefers B to C, but has never tasted new world wines,
so cannot compare A to either B or C. When he is undecided, DM chooses according to
price, and C is cheaper than A which is cheaper than B. This generates the following
‘irrational’ behavior: if only A and B are available DM chooses A; if only B and C are
available he chooses B; ﬁnally if only A and C are available he chooses C. DM exhibits
pairwise cyclical choices.
Procedure II captures more subtle considerations of the following kind. When all wines
are available, the DM perceives B and C as a group of ‘similar’ wines, the ‘old world’ wines.
When comparing groups, DM prefers the ‘new world’ Australian (degenerate) group to
the ‘old world’ group. However when only binary choices are available, DM looks straight
at price. This generates the following additional type of irrational behavior: A is selected
when all three wines are available, but C is selected (based on price) in both binary
contests in which it appears. DM exhibits a strong form of menu dependence.
We shall see below that the two types of ‘rationality failure’ just illustrated are an
exhaustive taxonomy also for general choices.
Formally, in both procedures, DM implements a two-stage algorithm to arrive at a
ﬁnal choice: two rationales (asymmetric and possibly incomplete, binary relations) are
used sequentially to eliminate alternatives from the choice set. The digerence lies in the
way the ﬁrst rationale operates. In procedure I, the ﬁrst rationale simply ranks (some
of) the alternatives. In procedure II, the ﬁrst rationale ranks instead sets of alternatives.
The interpretation is that the decision-maker perceives some alternatives as similar in
1See e.g. Roelofsma and Read [24], Tversky [32], and Waite [35] who ﬁnd evidence of pairwise cycles
of choice. The evidence presented in this paper points to further violations of rational behavior.
2Procedure I was ﬁrst introduced in Manzini and Mariotti [18].
2some aspect and treats them as a group (such as the ‘old world’ wines in the example).
In general there may be more than one similarity aspect, so groups might overlap. When
two similarity groups are disjoint, they may be related by the ﬁrst rationale. In this case,
the entire ‘losing’ group is eliminated. For both procedures, the second rationale is used
to eliminate further alternatives and to single out a choice.
Surprisingly, Procedure II is fully characterized by a single ‘revealed preference’ prop-
erty, which we call WARP* (Theorem 9). WARP* is a simple weakening of the standard
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (Samuelson [27]). WARP* adds to WARP the clauses
between brackets in the following deﬁnition: if x is directly revealed preferred to y [both
in pairwise contests and in the presence of a ‘menu’ of other alternatives], then y cannot
be directly revealed preferred to x [in the presence of a smaller menu]. This characteriza-
tion is one of the main contributions of our work. It shows how the analysis of non-trivial
forms of bounded rationality is amenable to tests on observed behavior of exactly the same
kind, and roughly as simple, as the tests used to check full rationality (maximization of a
transitive and complete binary relation).
Procedure I can be similarly characterized, as we have shown in Manzini and Mariotti
[18]. The choice data can be generated by procedure I if and only if they satisfy, in
addition to WARP*, another standard revealed preference property called Expansion.
Expansion says that if x is chosen from two sets of alternatives, then x is chosen when the
sets are merged. Expansion and WARP* together still constitute a weakening of WARP,
which implies both properties.
The nature of these procedures can be much better understood in the light of a simple
but crucial result on choice functions. Any failure of full rationality in choice (that is, a
violation of WARP) can be ultimately reduced to one (or both) of just two categories,
illustrated in the previous wine examples: pairwise inconsistent choice and ‘Condorcet
inconsistent’ choice. Condorcet inconsistency captures a speciﬁc type of ‘menu-egect’ in
choice: an alternative is chosen over each of a number of other alternatives in pairwise
choice, yet it is no longer chosen when all these alternatives are grouped together.3 On the
other hand, pairwise inconsistent choice involves only pairwise comparisons and therefore
does not incorporate any menu-egect. It thus captures a conceptually separate violation
of full rationality, namely that the pairwise comparisons do not allow the observer to
construct a preference relation with some minimal consistency property. Procedure I can
address violations of pairwise cyclical choice, but not of Condorcet inconsistency (which is
a necessary condition for choices generated by that procedure). Procedure II can explain
both types of irrational behavior. Needless to say, even Procedure II is not vacuous as it
can be tested by WARP*.
After developing our theoretical analysis, we put all the decision models discussed to
the test. To do so we elicit the choice function of experimental subjects out of all possible
subsets of a given initial set of alternatives. In many decision theory experiments only
pairwise choices (or preferences) are elicited. However, the taxonomy result discussed
above illustrates the importance of observing decision behavior on larger sets in order to
trace the sources of full rationality violations.
3Obviously there are other speciﬁcations of what constitutes menu-dependence, which for example
could be ‘dynamic’ (dependence on previous choices or status quo: see e.g. Masatlioglu and Ok [20],
Houy [14] and Botond and Koszegi [15]). See Sen [29] for a general discussion of menu-dependence.
3Our experiment uses as alternatives time sequences of monetary rewards. Our data
show that WARP is violated by a majority of subjects. One of our main contributions on
the experimental front is an enquiry into the speciﬁc nature of the violations of full ra-
tionality, based on our taxonomy result. In our context, more than 15% pairwise cyclical
choices were observed. Nonetheless these violations of full rationality were strongly asso-
ciated with violations of Expansion. The consequence of this fact is that Procedure I does
not make a big improvement of the standard maximization model (of course, Procedure
I may be more useful for other purposes4).
Our main experimental ﬁnding is that Procedure II is a successful model of bounded
rationality in the present case. The majority of violations of WARP are associated with
Condorcet inconsistency, so that any successful model will need to incorporate this type
of menu egect. Indeed, the large majority of subjects satisﬁes WARP* in all their choices,
thus validating our second model of decision making.
2T h e o r y
2.1 Preliminaries
Let X be a ﬁnite set of alternatives and let P  2X. A choice function on P is a function
 : P $ X, such that  (S) 5 S for all S 5 P. The only additional assumptions5 we make
on the domain P are that, for all x,y,z 5 X:
(i) {x,y} 5 P;
(ii) {x,y,z} 5 P .
For a binary relation B 5 X × X denote the Bmaximal elements of a set S 5 P by
max(S,B), that is:
max(S,B)={x 5 S| @y 5 S for which (y,x) 5 B}
Deﬁnition 1 A choice function is fully rational if there exists a complete order6 B 5
X × X such that  (S)=m a x( S,R) for all S 5 P.
As is well-known7, in the present context the fully rational choice functions are exactly
those that satisfy WARP, deﬁned below:
WARP: If x =  (S), y 5 S and x 5 T then y 6=  (T).
WARP says that if an alternative is directly revealed preferred to another, the latter
alternative can never be directly revealed preferred to the former (revealed preference is
an asymmetric relation).
4In Manzini and Mariotti [19] we study RSM’s with speciﬁc rationales and obtain a model of time
preferences with signiﬁcantly higher explanatory power than discounting models. In general, it is a
consequence of our theoretical results that when only pairwise choices are the object of interest, RSM is
as a good a model as two-rationality by simirity.
5The ﬁniteness assumption on the domain could be easily dispensed with, and replaced by a well-
behavedness assumption on the sets in 	, guaranteeing that complete and transitive relations on them
have a maximal element. This would just complicate notation so we stick with the ﬁnite case in the text.
6That is, a transitive binary relation.
7See e.g. Moulin [22] or Suzumura [31]
42.2 A taxonomy of irrationality
Failures of full rationality may mix together more than one elementary form of inconsis-
tency. To reduce lack of full rationality to its basic building blocks (to be studied in the
experiment), we consider the taxonomy of violations of WARP discussed in the introduc-
tion. We ﬁnd that choice behavior can be irrational essentially for two distinct reasons:
menu dependence and pairwise inconsistency. The latter category involves exclusively
choices between pairs of alternatives. The former category instead involves choices from
larger sets.
The following property captures the elementary form of menu independence:
Condorcet consistency:I fx =  ({x,z})f o ra l lz 5 S\{x} and S 5 P,t h e nx =  (S).
Condorcet consistency says that if an same alternative is chosen in pairwise contests
against any other alternative in a set, then this alternative will be chosen from the set.
Let P denote the base relation of a choice function ,t h a ti s( x,y) 5 P if and only
if x =  ({x,y}). Each of the following properties capture elementary forms of pairwise
consistency:
Base transitivity: P is transitive.
Base acyclicity: P is acyclic.
Base intervality: P satisﬁes the intervality condition8:I f( x,y),(w,z) 5 P then either
(x,z) 5 P or (w,y) 5 P
We note ﬁrst that all these conditions are equivalent:
Proposition 2 A choice function satisﬁes base intervality, if and only if it satisﬁes base
transitivity, if and only if it satisﬁes base acyclicity.
Proof: Base acyclicity , Base intervality. Suppose that  violates base intervality, that
is there exists x,y,w,z 5 X for which (x,y),(w,z) 5 P but (x,z),(w,y) / 5 P. Suppose
ﬁrst that x 6= z and w 6= y.T h e ns i n c e{x,z},{w,y} 5 P it must be (z,x),(y,w) 5 P.
T h e r e f o r ew eh a v ec o n s t r u c t e dt h eb a s ec y c l e( x,y),(y,w),(w,z),(z,x) 5 P. Suppose
next that x = z.T h e nw eh a v et h ec y c l e( x,y),(y,w),(w,x) 5 P. Similarly for the case
y = z.
Base intervality , Base transitivity. Suppose that  violates base transitivity, so
that there exists x,y,z 5 X for which (x,y),(y,z) 5 P but (x,z) / 5 P.B yt h es i n g l e -
valuedness of  it cannot be x = z, and by the fact that {x,z} 5 P it must be (z,x) 5 P.
N o ww eh a v e( x,y),(z,x) 5 P but also (x,x) / 5 P and (z,y) / 5 P, violating base
intervality.
That base transitivity implies base acyclicity is obvious.
The equivalence of all the base conditions makes it legitimate to speak simply of
pairwise consistency when the three conditions are met. The following is our basic clas-
siﬁcation result:
8Introduced in Fisburn [9].
5Theorem 3 A choice function satisﬁes WARP if and only if satisﬁes both Condorcet
consistency and pairwise consistency.
Proof: It is obvious that a choice function that violates Condorcet consistency also
violates WARP. Suppose it violates base transitivity. Then by the domain assumption (i)
there exists x,y,z 5 X for which (x,y),(y,z),(z,x) 5 P, and by the domain assumption
(ii) WARP is contradicted on {x,y,z}.
For the converse implication, suppose that  violates WARP, and let S.T 5 P be such
that x =  (S) 6= y =  (T), x,y 5 T _ S. Suppose that  satisﬁes base transitivity: we
show that then  must violate Condorcet consistency. By base transitivity there exist
base-maximal elements in S and T,t h a ti ss 5 S and t 5 T such that
s =  ({s,z})f o ra l lz 5 S\{s}
t =  ({t,z})f o ra l lz 5 T\{ t}
If s 6= x, then Condorcet consistency is violated on S.I f s = x,t h e ni np a r t i c u l a r
x =  ({x,y}). So y 6= t and Condorcet consistency is violated on T.
2.3 Two sequential models of decision making
We ﬁrst explain our Procedure I, introduced in Manzini and Mariotti [18] as ‘Rational
Shortlist Method’. From now on we shall call any asymmetric binary relation on X × X
a rationale.
Deﬁnition 4 A choice function  is a Rational Shortlist Method (RSM) if and only
if there exists an ordered pair (B1,B 2) of rationales such that:
{ (S)} = max(max(S,B1),B 2) for all S 5 P
In that case we say that (B1,B 2) sequentially rationalize .
So the choice from each S can be represented as if the decision maker went through two
sequential rounds of elimination of alternatives. In the ﬁrst round he retains only the ele-
ments which are maximal according to rationale B1. In the second round, he retains only
the element which is maximal according to rationale B2: that element is his choice. Note
that, crucially, the rationales and the sequence are invariant with respect to the choice
set. RSM’s are in the vein of several ‘noncompensatory’ sequential eliminative heuristics9
promoted by psychologists (such as the Elimination by Aspects model by Tversky [33],
or the ‘Fast and frugal heuristics’ by Gigerenzer and Todd [11]) and marketing scientist
(such as ‘greedoid based’ choice algorithms, Yee, Dahan, Hauser and Orlin [36]).
RSM are characterized by two axioms, one which is a weakening of WARP, and the
other is classical Expansion axiom:
9The adjective ‘noncompensatory’ refers to the fact that while several criteria are used, they cannot
be used to ‘compensate’ each other: unlike the arguments of a utility function, there is no trade-o in
the mind of the decision maker between one criterion and the next.
6WARP*: For all R,S 5 P :I f{x,y}  R  S and x =  ({x,y})= (S)t h e ny 6=  (R).
Expansion: For all R,S 5 P with S ^ T 5 P:I fx =  (S)= (T)t h e nx =  (S ^ T).
The following characterization result is an easy corollary of Theorem 2 in Manzini and
Mariotti [18].
Theorem 5 Suppose the domain P is closed under set union. Then  is an RSM if and
only if it satisﬁes WARP* and Expansion.
Next, we consider ‘Procedure II’ from the Introduction.
Deﬁnition 6 A rationale by similarities on X is an asymmetric relation B  2X×2X
satisfying the following two properties:
(i) R _ S = B whenever (R,S) 5 B
(ii) |R ^ S| > 2 whenever (R,S) 5 B
The interpretation of a rationale by similarities B is that some alternatives are grouped
by similarity in some aspect. Similarity can be in more than one aspect, hence two simi-
larity groups are not necessarily disjoint. However, two conditions suggest the similarity
interpretation. First, the decision-maker can only compare disjoint groups (condition
(i)). Moreover, what the relation compares are genuinely groups: degenerate comparisons
between singletons are not allowed (condition (ii)). For example, constant streams of mon-
etary payments can form a group ‘against’ increasing streams, and increasing three-period
streams could form a group against increasing two-period streams. The characterization
result below would hold without these restrictions.10
Deﬁnition 7 Given a rationale by similarity B and S 5 P,t h eBmaximal set on S is
given by:
max(S,B)={x 5 S| for no R
0,R
00  S it is the case that (R
0,R
00) 5 B1 and x 5 R
00}
We are now ready for our main deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 8 A choice function  is two-rational by similarities if and only if there
exists a rationale by similarities B1 and a rationale B2 such that:
{ (S)} = max(max(S,B1),B 2) for all S 5 P
So, the decision maker looks ﬁrst at groups rankings, and eliminates any group which
is dominated by another group. Then, she decides among the remaining alternatives
on the basis of the second rationale. For example, if the choice set is comprised of two
decreasing streams of money and two increasing streams, the decision maker may ﬁrst
select the group of decreasing streams and then select within that group. When this
procedure leads to a single chosen alternative for each choice set, the resulting choice
function is two-rational by similarities.
Below we make some observations which highlight key digerences between the two
sequential procedures we have introduced.
10Rubinstein [25] (and more recently [26]) pioneered in economic theory the analysis of similarity
considerations in decision-making. In his work, Rubinstein axiomatizes directly a similarity relation.
7Remark 1 Condorcet consistency is a necessary condition for an RSM. However, there
are choice functions which violate Condorcet consistency and yet are two-rational by
similarities. For instance, take the following choice function, with the base relation
as indicated in ﬁgure 1: X = {a,b,c,d},  (X)= ({a,b,c})= ({b,c,d})=b,
 ({a,c,d})= ({a,b,d})=a. Condorcet consistency is violated, since a is chosen in
pairwise comparisons over each of the other alternatives, and yet a is not chosen from the
grand set, nor from {a,b,c}. However, this choice function is two-rational by similarities








Figure 2: Base relation for remark 3
Remark 2 Consider the following dual property to Condorcet consistency: an alternative
is not chosen in a set in which it is never chosen in any pairwise choice. Formally, if
x 6=  ({x,z}) for all z 5 S\{x} and S 5 P,t h e nx 6=  (S). It is easy to show that this
property too is a necessary condition for an RSM. However, there exist choice functions
that violate never chosen and yet are two-rational by similarities. Consider the choice
function with the same base relation as the one in ﬁgure 1, where  (X)= ({a,b,c})=
 ({b,c,d})=b,  ({a,b,d})=a and  ({a,c,d})=d. This last choice violates the dual
to Condorcet consistency. This choice function is two-rational by similarities by the two
asymmetric relations B1 = {({b},{a,c}),({d},{a,c})},a n dB2 coinciding with the base
relation.
Remark 3 Two-rationality by similarities is not a vacuous notion: there are choice func-
tions which are not two-rational by similarities. To see this, consider the following ex-
ample. Let X = {a,b,c,d} and let the choice function be  (X)= ({a,b,c})=a,
 ({a,b,d})= ({b,c,d})=b and  ({a,c,d})=c,w h e r et h eb a s er e l a t i o ni sa si nﬁ g u r e
2. Then, since b is chosen in {a,b,d},t h e r em u s tb e(R0,R 00) 5 B1,w i t ha 5 R00,s o
that a is eliminated before it can eliminate b.B u t s i n c eR0,R 00  X,t w o - r a t i o n a l i t yb y
similarities is made impossible by a =  (X).
The choice function in the last example violates WARP*. As we show next, this
property alone characterizes two-rationality by similarities. To ease notation, ﬁxing the
choice function , we deﬁne the upper and lower contour sets of an alternative on a set
S 5 P as
Up(x,S)={y 5 X|(y,x) 5 P} _ S
and
Lo(x,S)={y 5 X|(x,y) 5 P} _ S
respectively.
8Theorem 9 A choice function is two-rational by similarities if and only if it satisﬁes
WARP*.
Proof: Necessity. Suppose that  is two-rational by similarities by B1 and B2. Sup-
pose x =  ({x,y})a n dx =  (S)w i t hy 5 S. Now suppose by contradiction that
y =  (R)w i t hx 5 R  S. This means that x must be eliminated in the ﬁrst round
of elimination in R (if not, then either x would eliminate y in the second round, or
 ({x,y})=x would contradict the assumption that  is rationalized by B1 and B2). In
particular there exist R0,R 00  R, such that (R0,R 00) 5 B1 and x 5 R00.S i n c eR0,R 00  S
this contradicts x =  (S).
Suciency. Deﬁne: (x,y) 5 B2 if and only if x =  ({x,y}). B2 is obviously asym-
metric. Deﬁne: (R,S) 5 B1 if and only if there exists T 5 P such that
R = { (T)} ^ Lo( (T),T)
and
S = Up( (T),T) 6= B
B1 is also obviously asymmetric and note that R _ S = B whenever R and S are related
by B1.
Now let S 5 P and let x =  (S). We show that x is not eliminated in either round.
Suppose ﬁrst that (y,x) 5 B2 for some y 5 S .T h e nb yc o n s t r u c t i o n
({x} ^ Lo(x,S),Up(x,S)) 5 B1
and y is eliminated in the ﬁrst round.
Next, suppose by contradiction that x is eliminated in the ﬁrst round. Then there
exists R0,R 00  S with (R0,R 00) 5 B1 and x 5 R00. Deﬁne R = R0 ^ R00. By construction
of B1 it must be
R
0 = { (R)} ^ Lo( (R),R)
and
R
00 = Up( (R),R)
This means that
x =  ({x, (R)})
Together with x =  (S) (and noting that R = R0 ^ R00  S) this contradicts WARP*.
It remains to note that y is eliminated either in the ﬁrst round or in the second round
for all y 6= x.I fy =  ({x,y}), then y is eliminated in the ﬁrst round. If x =  ({x,y})
then y is eliminated in the second round since as we have seen x survives the ﬁrst round.
3E x p e r i m e n t
3.1 Experimental Design
The experiment was carried out at the Computable and Experimental Economics Labo-
ratory at the University of Trento, in Italy. We ran a total of 13 sessions between July
92005 and February 2006. Participants were recruited through bulletin board advertising
from the student population of the University of Trento. Male and female participants
took part in each experimental session in roughly equal proportions. The experiment
was computerised, and each participant was seated at an individual computer station,
using separators so that subjects could not see the choices made by other participants.
Experimental sessions lasted an average of around 26 minutes, of which an average of 18
minutes of egective play, with the shortest one lasting approximately 16 minutes and the
longest around 37 minutes. We considered two treatments, one in which subjects received
only a 5 Euro showup fee (a total 56 subjects in 4 sessions), and one with payments based
on choice, where as we explain more in detail below an additional 48 Euros were made
available to each subject (a total of 102 subjects in nine sessions).11 We will refer to
these two treatments as the HYP (for hypothetical) and PAY (for paid), respectively.12
At the beginning of the experiment subjects read instructions on their monitor, while
an experimenter read the instructions aloud to the participants.13 In each treatment,
each experimental subject was presented with 23 digerent screens. Each screen asked
the subject to choose the preferred one among a set of alternative remuneration plans in
installments to be received staggered over a time horizon of nine months, each consisting
of 48 Euros overall. Instructions were the same in both treatments, bar for one sentence,
which in the HYP treatment clariﬁed that choices were purely hypothetical, so that the
only payment to be received would be the show up fee; whereas for the PAY treatment it
was explained that at the end of the experiment one screen would be selected at random,
and the preferred plan for that screen would be delivered to the subjects.14
Choices were based on two sets - depending on the number of installments - of four
plans each, namely an increasing (I), a decreasing (D), a constant (K) and a jump (J)
series of payments, over either two or three installments, as shown below. Though in both
cases payments extended over nine months, because of the digerent number of installments
we abuse terminology and refer to ‘two-period’ and ‘three-period’ sequences rather than
two/three-installment sequences:
Two period sequences Three period sequences
I2 D2 K2 J2 I3 D3 K3 J3
in three months 16 32 24 8 8 24 16 8 in three months
16 16 16 8 in six months
in nine months 32 16 24 40 24 8 16 32 in nine months
Table 1: the base remuneration plans
Each subject had to choose the preferred plan from each possible subset of plans within
11The show up fee alone, for an average of less than thirty minute long experimental session, was higher
than the hourly pay on campus, which is 8 Euros. At the time of the experiments the exchange rate of
the Euro was approximately 1Euro=1.2$=0.7$.
12Distinguishing by treatment, sessions lasted an average of about 28 minutes for the PAY treatment,
of which an average of just above 19 minutes of eective play; and an average of around 22 minutes for
the HYP treatment, of which an average of about 16 minutes of eective play.
13See the appendix for the translation of the original instructions (in Italian).
14The experimental lab has a long tradition, so there was no issue of (mis)trust in receiving delayed
payments. At the time of writing all subjects have been paid.
10each group (making up 11 choices per group). In addition, in a 23rd question subjects
were asked to choose between the three period sequences SJ=(8,32,8) and SI=(24,8,16).
This was needed to address an issue for a digerent experiment, which we discuss elsewhere
(see Manzini, Mariotti and Mittone [19]).
Once made, each choice had to be conﬁrmed, so as to minimize the possibility of errors.
Both the order in which the twenty-three questions appeared on screen and the position
of each option on the screen was randomized. Figure 3 displays sample screenshots of the
sort of choices. The participants made their choice by clicking with their mouse on the
button corresponding to the preferred remuneration plan.
Figure 3: Sample screenshots
In the experiment we elicited the choice functions with domain over all subsets for
each of the two grand sets X2={I2,D2,K2,J2} and X3={I3,D3,K3,J3}.T h i s
enables us to check whether or not the axioms discussed in section 2 hold. In particular,
we can assess (i) what the main reason is for the failure of full rationality (violation of
pairwise consistency or violation of Condorcet consistency), and (ii) what proportion of
choice functions can be rationalized in the standard way, what proportion is an RSM and
what proportion is two-rational by similarities.
3.2 Experimental results I: Evaluating the models
We begin by noting that we can rule out the possibility that experimental subjects choose
randomly.15 Since we are eliciting the entire choice functions from universal sets with four
alternatives, with a uniform probability distribution on each choice set, the probability of
15Purely random choice is an important benchamrk. Within consumer’s choice, the idea was ﬁrst
advanced by Becker [4] and it is used for example as the alternative hypothesis in the popular Bronars [5]
11observing even only two subjects with the same choice is egectively zero for all practical
purposes. In fact, as there are a possible 26 · 34 · 4=2 0 ,736 choice functions on each
universal set, that probability is (20,736)
32 =2 .3257 × 1039. On the contrary for both
treatments and for both universal sets X2a n dX3 we ﬁnd almost half of the subjects with
the same modal choice function. For illustration we report the frequency distributions
(omitting the labels for legibility) of the observed choice functions only graphically in
Figure 4. The corresponding raw data are reported in tables 24 and 25 in appendix A.5.
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Figure 4: Frequency distributions of choice proﬁles by treatment and sequence length
index of power for nonparametric revealed preference tests. See Andreoni and Harbaugh [2] for a recent
discussion of this issue.
12Before turning to the evaluation of the models16, we check which, if any, of the two
failures of full rationality highlighted in Theorem 3 in section 2.2 is more prevalent. To this
egect we begin by reporting aggregate data for the violations of Pairwise and Condorcet
Consistency for each of the choice functions elicited (i.e. the choice functions from 2X2
and from 2X3 for each treatment):
PAY HYP
2p e r i o d s 3p e r i o d s 2p e r i o d s 3p e r i o d s
# % # % # % # %
Condorcet Consistency 39 38.2 30 28.4 14 25 12 21.4
Pairwise Consistency 12 11.8 7 6.9 3 5.4 3 5.4
Table 2: Axiom violations in the two treatments.
Since we are mainly interested in the decisions of individual subjects over all their
choices, we report below a summary of overall violations of Condorcet Consistency and
Pairwise Consistency by experimental subject: PAY HYP
# % # %
Condorcet Consistency 51 50 22 39.3
Pairwise Consistency 17 16.7 4 7.1
Table 3: Overall violations of PC and CC.
From table 3 it emerges that failures of Condorcet Consistency are substantially more
frequent than violations of Pairwise Consistency. This digerence is statistically signif-
icant, regardless of treatment. In fact, the McNemar test of the hypothesis that the
proportions of subjects violating Condorcet Consistency is the same as the proportion of
subjects violaitng Pairwise Consistency yields exact p-values of 0.0 0 9i nt h ec a s eo ft h e
PAY treatment, and of 0.001 in the case of the HYP treatment. If we then look at the
digerences in the proportion of violations of each of the two axioms across treatments,
the fall in the proportion of violations when moving from the PAY to the HYP treatment
is not statistically signiﬁcant: Fisher test’s exact mid-p values are 0.110 for Condorcet
Consistency and 0.470 for Pairwise Consistency.
Next, we turn to the three models examined in section 2.3, and we study the viola-
tions of the axioms which characterize those models.17 Recall that one model is the full
rationality model (characterized by WARP), the other is the RSM model (characterized
by WARP* and Expansion) and the third is the two-rationality by similarities model
(characterized by WARP*). Again we start by looking at data for each choice function,
reported in table 4.
16All the exact statistical analysis has been carried out usting StatXact, v.7. For a comprehensive
treatment of exact and other methods in categorical data analysis see Agresti [1].
17In our experiment we use a small universal set of alternatives. Evidence for choice from budget sets
includes Fevrier and Visser [8], Mattei [21] and especially Sippel [30], who ﬁnd substantial violations of
the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preferences in choices out of budget sets. However, Andreoni and
Harbaugh [2] argue that most of these violations are ‘small’ on the basis of Afriat’s eciency index.
Indeed Harbaugh, Krause and Berry [13] and especially Andreoni and Miller [3] ﬁnd that subjects have
choices consistent with GARP in experiments with budget sets.
13PAY HYP
2p e r i o d s 3p e r i o d s 2p e r i o d s 3p e r i o d s
# % # % # % # %
WARP* 22 21.6 12 11.7 6 10.7 5 8.9
Expansion 39 38.2 30 29.4 14 25 13 23.2
WARP 43 42.2 30 29.4 16 28.6 13 23.2
Table 4: Violations of the axioms used for rationalizability.
Table 4 shows that WARP is violated quite considerably in the PAY treatment, and
less so - though still substantially - in the HYP treatment. Expansion is violated slightly
less often than WARP overall, but much more often than WARP*.
Overall violations by each individual, regardless of choice set, are reported in table 5.
PAY HYP
# % # %
Expansion 51 50 22 39.3
WARP* 29 28.4 8 14.3
WARP 54 52.9 22 39.3
Table 5: Overall axiom violations.
The proportion of subjects violating each axiom falls when moving from the PAY to
the HYP treatment. Of these digerences, those concerning WARP and WARP* are sta-
tistically signiﬁcant, while for Expansion this is not the case (Fisher test’s exact mid-p
values are 0.110 for Expansion, 0.042 for WARP and 0.022 for WARP*). Like Table
4, Table 5 also suggests similar rates of violation for Expansion and WARP (50% and
52.9%), and substantially lower rates for WARP* compared to either of the other axioms
(28.4%). Within treatment, however, the only meaningful comparison in the digerence of
proportions is between failures of Expansion and WARP*, which are the only two inde-
pendent axioms.18 Here the hypothesis of equality in the proportion of subjects violating
the two axiom is rejected (McNemar’s exact p-value is 0.002 in the PAY treatment and
0.041 in the HYP treatment).
Table 5 conﬁrms that WARP, and therefore the full rationality model, does not de-
scribe the data well, especially in the PAY treatment where less than half of the subjects
ﬁt the model.
Consider now RSM’s. The crosstabulation of violations of the two axioms character-
izing it is reported in table 6.
Interestingly, in both treatments, no individual who satisﬁes Expansion violates WARP*
(recall that they are logically independent axioms). That is, the (large) number of Ex-
pansion violators is not joined by another separate group of WARP* violators in order
18For comparisons between the proportion of violations of other pairs of axioms it is not possible to
rely on a McNemar test, as violations of either Expansion or WARP* imply violations of WARP (i.e. the
relevant contingency table would have structural zeroes). We defer tackling of this issue to our discussion
of the relative performance of alternative theories further below.
14PAY HYP
Expansion Expansion
× X × X
# % # % # % # %
WARP* × 29 28.4 0 0 8 14.3 0 0 × WARP*
X 22 21.6 51 50 14 25 34 60.7 X
Table 6: Violations of WARP* and Expansion
to determine the RSM violators. The RSM violators are simply counted by Expansion
violators (of which some are also WARP* violators). The main fact remains, however,
that RSM improve only marginally on order maximization in their ability to explain the
data for the PAY treatment (decreasing the violations from 52.9i nt h ec a s eo fW A R Pt o
50% in the case of RSM), and they are as bad in the HYP treatment.
Finally, we turn to WARP* and the model of two rationalizability by similarities.
From Table 5 we can see that WARP* is satisﬁed by just below 72% of the subjects in
the PAY treatment and just below 86% of the subjects in the HYP treatment.
In summary then:
PAY HYP
# % # %
Full rationality 48 47.1 34 60.7
Rational Shortlist Method 51 50 34 60.7
Two-rationality by similarities 73 71.6 48 85.7
Table 7: Explanatory power of competing theories.
T h et h r e em o d e l sa r en e s t e d ,t h a ti s
Full Rationality , Rational Shortlist Method , Two-rationality by similarities
In order to compare the incremental ‘explanatory’ power in each more general theory
we take a conservative approach, and look at the 95% exact conﬁdence intervals19 for
the proportion of subjects whose choices are compatible with each theory. In the PAY
treatment these conﬁdence intervals are [0.371,0.572] for the proportion of subjects com-
patible with Full rationality, [0.399,0.601] for the proportion of subjects compatible with
an RSM and [0.618,0.801] for the proportion of subjects compatible with two-rationality
by similarities. For the HYP treatment the conﬁdence intervals are [0.467,0.735] for Full
rationality and RSM20 and [0.738,0.936] for two-rationality by similarities21.T h u si nb o t h
19These are computed with the Clopper and Pearson method, which is generally very conservative (the
coverage probability can be much greater than the nominal conﬁdence level in small samples). In our
c a s e ,f o rt h eP A Yt r e a t m e n t ,t h es a m p l ei sl a r g ee n o u g ha n dt h e r ei sn od i e r e n c eb e t w e e nt h eC l o p p e r -
Pearson and the shorter Blyth-Still-Casella exact conﬁdence intervals. For the smaller sample of the HYP
treatment, there is a very slight dierence between the two methods, as reported below.
20The Blyth-Still-Casella conﬁdence interval is [0.467,0.728].
21The Blyth-Still-Casella conﬁdence interval is [0.747,0.936].
15treatments the lower bound of the conﬁdence interval for two-rationality by similarities
lies above the upper bound of the other two conﬁdence intervals.
Summary and comment. The general indication we draw from the data is that any
model addressing lack of full rationality in a choice function must be able to explain menu
egects in the form of Condorcet inconsistency.
This indication is conﬁrmed in the analysis of the three models we have studied in
this paper. Neither the full rationality nor the RSM model are compatible with menu
egects of the Condorcet consistency type, and indeed they both fail badly at explaining
the data. Disappointingly, the RSM model performs only marginally better than the full
rationality model. The proportion of successes in explaining behavior is not increased
signiﬁcantly when weakening WARP to the combination of Expansion and WARP*.
The model of two-rationality by similarities is compatible with Condorcet inconsis-
tency, and it is successful. There is a signiﬁcant leap in the proportion of successes in
explaining behavior when weakening WARP to WARP*. The resulting model can explain
50% more data compared to the other two models, namely over 70% in one treatment
and over 85% in the other treatment.
Remember that our test for the ‘success’ of a model is harsh: we would like each
individual to satisfy a model in both choice contexts (choices among short sequences and
choices among long sequences). If instead we focussed separately on the four choice
functions we have observed, the model of two-rationality by similarities would explain
almost 80% of the choice functions in the worst case, and more than 90% in the best case.
3.3 Experimental results II: Other considerations
The data allow a plethora of additional considerations - due to space limitations we cannot
analyze them all in this paper, and limit ourselves to highlighting just a few. Two clear
patterns concerning violations of the axioms that emerge from both the aggregate data
tables and the individual choice data tables are the following:
1. People are more consistent for longer sequences.F o r each axiom considered, the
proportion of choices or subjects violating it falls as sequence length increases, irre-
spective of treatment.
2. People are more consistent if they are not paid. For each axiom considered, the
proportion of choices or subjects violating it falls when incentives are removed, i.e.
when passing from the PAY to the HYP treatment, regardless of sequence length.
In addition, by looking at the crosstabulation of violations of each axiom by sequence
length, we can measure, for each axiom, the proportion of subjects failing to satisfy it for
at least one choice function. Crosstabulations of this sort allow us to test for each axiom
the following:
• within each treatment: (i) the statistical signiﬁcance of the fall in the proportions
of violations when going from shorter to longer sequences, and (ii) whether or not
violations observed for digerent sequence length are associated.
16• across treatments: whether, controlling for sequence length, the proportion of vio-
lations depends on treatment, i.e. whether elicitation of choices by incentive com-
patible means in the PAY treatment results in a digerent proportion of subjects
violating each axiom as compared to the HYP treatment.
We summarize our main ﬁndings by means of table 8 below (the detailed derivation
of this summary is relegated to appendix A.1). Notationwise, Z2 and Z3 refer to the
proportions of subjects violating an axiom in choices involving two and three period
sequences, respectively, for any given treatment. In addition, for any given sequence
length, ZPAY and ZHYP refer to the proportions of subjects violating an axiom in the
PAY and HYP treatment, respectively.
Within treatment Across treatment
PAY HYP ZPAY > ZHYP
Z2 > Z3 random errors Z2 > Z3 random errors 2 periods 3 periods
CC X × × X X ×
PC × X ×× X (10%) ×
WARP* X × (10%) ×× X ×
EXP X (10%) × × X X ×
WARP X × ×× X ×
Table 8: Comparisons of proportions and association.
In the leftmost part of table 8 (under the heading ‘within treatment’) we report (i)
w h e t h e ro rn o tZ2 is statistically larger than Z3,a n d(ii) whether violation of an axiom
for shorter sequences makes it any more likely that the subject violates the same axiom
when choosing out of longer sequences, too. If this is not the case, one may assume that
digerences in the proportions of violations across sequence length are due to the subjects
making mistakes independently from one another - in table 8 this lack of association is
referred to by the shorthand ‘random errors’. In each column, we use a tick (X) when the
relevant statistic is such that the heading in the table ‘holds’, and a cross (×) when the
heading in the column ‘fails’. So for point (i), a tick indicates that the Z2 is statistically
larger than Z3, while a cross indicates that the digerence in proportion is not statistically
signiﬁcant.22 Regarding (ii) instead we use a tick to indicate that indeed digerences may
be just random, and a cross when this is not the case.23
22To be precise, the null hypothesis of the test for (i) is that the proportion of violations is the same
regardless of sequence length against a one sided alternative that the proportion of violations for two
period sequences is larger than for three period sequences. Then the tick refers to the null being rejected.
To test this hypothesis we rely on McNemar’ statistic.
23To be precise, the null hypothesis of the test is for lack of association between rows and columns
in the cross-tabulation (i.e. the odds ratio is equal to 1). If this hypothesis is rejected, then rows and
columns are associated, i.e. a subject is much more likely to violate the axiom in choice among three
period sequences when he has done so in choice out of two period sequences too. In the table we abuse
terminology for the sake of clarity, so that a tick corresponds to a rejection of the null hypothesis, while
a cross stands for failure to reject. We base this test on Fisher’s statistic.
Note that tests (i) and (ii) are independent, in the sense that a high p-value in the McNemar test
does not necessarily imply a high p-value of the Fisher test, and viceversa. For instance, in the table
17The rightmost part of the table instead reports whether, for any given sequence length,
the fall in the proportion of subjects violating a given axiom when moving from the PAY
to the HYP treatment is statistically signiﬁcant (which we denote by a tick X)o rn o t
(which we denote by a cross ×).24
There is no clear pattern of association across sequence length for the violations of
each axiom (‘random error’ columns). Broadly, digerences in choice behavior between two
and three period sequences are more pronounced in the PAY than in the HYP treatment
(‘Z2 > Z3’ columns). Moreover choice behavior for three period sequences does not diger
much between the two treatments, whereas it does for choices over two period sequences
(‘ZPAY > ZHYP’ columns). However, a quick inspection of choice behavior by subject
(table 7) shows that for all of the three models analyzed, their ability to explain the data
increases in the HYP treatment as compared to the PAY treatment: when moving from
the PAY to the HYP treatment, the percentage of subjects whose choice function is an
RSM increases by 10.7%, the percentage of subjects whose choice function can be ratio-
nalized in the standard way increases by 13.6%, and the percentage of subjects who are
two rational by similarity increases by 14.1%. For the latter two notions of rationalizabil-
ity these increments are statistically signiﬁcant25, and ‘just’ not signiﬁcant for rational
shortlist methods26. Our data show a very clear pattern whereby monetary incentives to
elicit choices which are the expression of ‘true’ preferences have the egect of producing
less ‘rational’ behavior. Providing a rigorous explanation for this phenomenon would go
beyond the scope of this paper and the bounds of economics. Still, this seems to open
ad i gerent angle to the discussion on the role of monetary incentives in experiments. In
the economics literature this generally revolves around whether or not monetary incen-
tives are necessary to elicit ‘true’ preferences or the ‘best’ outcome (see e.g. Camerer and
Hogarth [6], Read [23] and Harrison and Rutstr¨ om [7]). However, we note that an empir-
ical regularity in experiments is that subjects are upset when confronted with their own
inconsistencies27. One might argue that the absence or presence of monetary incentives
constitutes a change of (experimental) ‘frame’, so that what matters is not the composi-
tion of the set from which the choice is going to be made, rather the objects it includes
long
yes no
short yes 2 8
no 1 4
based on the Mc Nemar test one rejects the null of equality of proportion whereas
based on the Fisher test one fails to reject the null of lack of association between rows and columns.
24To be precise, the null hypothesis of the test is for equality in the proportion of subjects violating
a given axiom across the PAY and HYP populations, based on the Fisher test (i.e. the odds ratio for
the table with treatments against violation is equal to unity). If this hypothesis is rejected (against the
one sided alternative that the proportion of violations in the PAY treatment is larger than in the HYP
treatment), then the two proportions are statistically dierent. In the table we abuse notation for the
sake of expositional clarity, so that a tick corresponds to a rejection of the null hypothesis, while a cross
stands for failure to reject.
25In comparing proportions of violations in the PAY and HYP treatments, Fisher test’s exact mid-p
values are 0.042 for WARP, i.e. standard rationalisability; and 0.022 for WARP*, i.e. two-rationality by
similarities.
26The exact mid-p value from the Fisher test is is 0.101.
27This is based on the casual evidence that generally emerges in de-brieﬁng discussions, although there
is psychological literature that deals with the eect of aective states on decisions, see e.g. Luce, Bettman
and Payne [17].
18and whether or not monetary incentives for choice exist. In other words, the choice set
when any alternative once chosen is then going to be experienced is a digerent object
from a choice set with the same set of available alternative but where choice itself is just
a thought experiment. In addition, there may be other ‘external’ relevant dimensions to
the problem, such as the decision makers’ values, motivations and so on, which might in-
ﬂuence choice.28 Based on these considerations, we advance the tentative hypothesis that
our results, too, support the position that incentive compatible elicitation of preference is
necessary to elicit preferences that are closer to those that a decision maker would display
in a real life choice situation. Where choices are only hypothetical in nature, as in the
HYP treatment, the decision maker’s main concern is that of being consistent, resulting
in less frequent violations of the axioms. In this sense, our results invite caution in the
use of introspection for testing the ‘plausibility’ of competing axioms of choice.
3.4 Experimental results III: ‘La donna e’ mobile’
When looking at violations of the axioms across sexes, a pattern emerges whereby inconsis-
tencies are more frequent among female than male participants, irrespective of treatment:
that is, within each treatment the proportion of females that violate the axioms is higher
than men (with one exception). In addition, the pattern we highlighted in the previous
section - whereby with the removal of monetary incentives for choice the proportion of
violations of our axioms decreases - persists regardless of sex:
PAY HYP
F M F M
# % # % # % # %
CC 27 57.4% 24 43.6% 14 48.3% 8 29.6%
Expansion 27 57.4% 24 43.6% 14 48.3% 8 29.6%
WARP* 17 36.2% 12 21.8% 5 17.2% 3 11.1%
PC 7 14.9% 10 18.2% 3 10.3% 1 3.7%
WARP 27 57.4% 27 49.1% 14 48.3% 8 29.6%
Table 9: Violations of the axioms by sex.
Most of these digerences, however, are not statistically signiﬁcant. In particular:
1. Within treatment:
• The digerence in proportions of men and women violating Condorcet Consis-
tency and Expansion is statistically signiﬁcant at 10% conﬁdence level in both
the PAY and the HYP treatments;29
• The digerence in proportions of men and women violating Pairwise Consistency
is not signiﬁcant in either treatment;30
28This point has been made very clearly by Sen [28].
29The mid-p value for the Fisher test is 0.087 for the PAY treatment and 0.084 for the HYP treatment.
30The mid-p value for the Fisher test is 0.336 for the PAY treatment and 0.199 for the HYP treatment.
19• The digerence in proportions of men and women violating WARP* is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at 10% conﬁdence level in the PAY treatment and not
statistically signiﬁcant in the HYP treatment;31
• The digerence in proportions of men and women violating WARP is not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant in the PAY treatment and statistically signiﬁcant at 10%
conﬁdence level in the HYP treatment.32
2. across treatments:
• For female participants, the only digerence in the proportions of subjects vi-
olating a given axiom across treatments which is statistically signiﬁcant is for
WARP*, for which the Fisher test returns a mid-p value of 0.042;33
• For male participants the only digerences in proportions which are statistically
signiﬁcant are for Pairwise Consistency, for which the Fisher test yields a p-
value of 0.037; and WARP, whose mid-p value from the Fisher test is 0.051.34
The analysis above shows also that there are substantial digerences (though not alwasy
statistically signiﬁcant) in the proportion of women and men whose choices conform to
either Full rationality (i.e. their choices satisfy WARP) or two-rationality by similarities
(i.e. their choices satisfy WARP*). To check dige r e n c e si nt h es e x e sa st ot h ee x p l a n a t o r y





× X × X
# % # % # % # %
WARP* × 17 36.2% 0 0% 12 21.8% 0 0% × WARP*
X 10 21.3% 20 42.6% 12 21.8% 31 56.4% X
Table 10: RSM by sex in the PAY treatment.
When considering rational shortlist methods, then, the digerence across sexes is quite
substantial in both treatments (around 13% in the PAY treatment and just short of 20%
in the HYP treatment), and it is also statistically signiﬁcant at 10% conﬁdence level
for both treatments35.F i n a l l y ,d i gerences across treatments by sex are not statistically
31The mid-p value for the Fisher test is 0.059 for the PAY treatment and 0.27 for the HYP treatment.
32The mid-p value for the Fisher test is 0.21 for the PAY treatment and 0.084 for the HYP treatment.
33T h em i d - pv a l u ef o rt h eF i s h e rt e s ti se q u a lt o0 .224 for Condorcet Consistency, WARP and Expan-
sion, and equal to 0.30 for Pairwise Consistency.
34The other mid-p values for the Fisher test are equal to 0.117 for both Condorcet Consistency and
Expansion, and to 0.129 for WARP*.
35The mid-p values for the Fisher test of the dierence in the proportion of men and women satisfying




× X × X
# % # % # % # %
WARP* × 5 17.2% 0 0% 3 11.1% 0 0% × WARP*
X 9 31.1% 15 51.7% 5 18.5% 19 70.4% X




F M F M
# % # % # % # %
Rationalizability 20 42.6 28 50.9 15 51.7 19 70.4
Rational Shortlist Methods 20 42.6 31 56.4 15 51.7 19 70.4
2-Rationality by Similarities 30 63.8 43 78.2 24 82.8 24 88.9
Table 12: Explanatory power of competing theories across sexes
The notion of two-rationality by similarities works better than the other two regardless
of sex. Across sexes, there are digerences:
• the proportion of men whose choices are rationalizable is higher than the proportion
of women in the HYP treatment, but not in the PAY treatment;37
• the proportion of men whose choices are RSM is statistically signiﬁcantly higher
than the proportion of women in both the PAY and HYP treatment;38
• the proportion of men whose choices are ”-rational by similarities is higher than the
proportion of women in the PAY but not in the HYP treatment.39
It is very hard to explain any of these digerences in behavior within a purely economic
framework. We leave further analysis to scholars in other ﬁelds.
36The mid-p values for the Fisher test of the dierence in the proportion of subjects satisfying RSM
in the HYP and PAY treatments is equal to 0.228 for Female participants and equal to 0.117 for Male
participants.
37The Fisher test yields an exact mid-p value equal to 0.215 for the PAY treatment and to 0.084 for
the HYP treatment (i.e. for the latter the dierence in proportions is signiﬁcant at 10% conﬁdence level).
38The Fisher test yields an exact mid-p value equal to 0.086 for the PAY treatment and to 0.084 for
the HYP treatment (i.e. the dierence in proportions is signiﬁcant at 10% conﬁdence level).
39The Fisher test yields an exact mid-p value equal to 0.059 for the PAY treatment (i.e. statistical
signiﬁcance is at 10% conﬁdence level) and to 0.272 for the HYP treatment.
214C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
We have shown in this paper that the standard revealed preference methodology can be
successfully used to study ‘behavioral’ choice procedures. Both the utility maximization
model and the sequential eliminative heuristics we call Rational Shortlist Methods do
not explain well the choice data elicited in our experiment. However, our proposed new
model of two-rationality by similarities performs much better. Most violations of utility
maximization appear to be due to menu egects (Condorcet inconsistency) rather than to
pairwise inconsistency. The main virtue of the model of two-rationality by similarities
is its ability to capture in a simple way such menu egects: it is for this reason that it
‘outperforms’ the other models.
Though in this paper we have focused on abstract decision making procedures, our
experiment is also of speciﬁc interest for the theory of choice over time. Although we
pursue a more focused analysis of competing theories for the modelling of time preference
elsewhere,40 here we oger a few remarks on this aspect. Choice over time has come under
increasing scrutiny in recent years, following a series of observed anomalies that cast doubt
on the descriptive validity of the standard model of exponential discounting (see Frederick,
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue [10] for a recent and comprehensive survey). Our results
s u g g e s tt h a tn o to n l yt h es t a n d a r dm o d e l ,b u ta l s os o m em o r er e c e n tm o d e l st h a ta d d r e s s
behavioral anomalies (notably the now very popular hyperbolic discounting model) are
descriptively inadequate. No simple change in the functional form of the discounting
function will be descriptively adequate, since any such modiﬁed theory assumes that
choice behavior is based on the maximization of some objective function. Neither of the
two egects noted in our experiment, pairwise inconsistency and Condorcet inconsistency,
can be addressed in this way. In this sense, our results support the arguments put forward
by Rubinstein [26].
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A Appendices
A.1 Analysis of violations of the axioms, crosstabulated by se-
quence length
We report in this section the crosstabulation of violations of each of the ﬁve axioms
considered in the main text by sequence length. This allows us to measure for each axiom
the proportion of subjects failing to satisfy it for either longer or shorter sequences.
24In the tables that follow we use a cross (×) to indicate that the axiom is violated and
at i c k( X) to indicate that it holds. For each axiom we report: (i) within each treatment
(i.e. PAY or HYP) whether the proportion of subjects violating the axiom falls with the
increase in sequence length in a statistically signiﬁcant measure, and whether violations for
shorter sequences are associated to violations for longer sequences ( i.e. ‘random mistakes’
in the sense of section 3.3); and (ii) across treatment whether monetary incentives have
an egect on the proportions of subjects violating each axiom.
Condorcet Consistency
PAY HYP
3p e r i o d s 3p e r i o d s
× X × X
# % # % # % # %
2p e r i o d s × 18 17.6 21 20.6 4 7.1 10 17.9
X 12 11.8 51 50 8 14.3 34 60.7
Table 13: Violations of Condorcet Consistency for digerent sequence length.
• Within treatment: PAY. For the PAY treatment, the proportion of subjects violating
Condorcet Consistency falls from 38.2% to 29.4% as sequence length increases, and
this digerence is statistically signiﬁcant at 10% conﬁdence level (the exact p-value
f o rt h eM c N e m a rt e s ti s0 .081). In addition, we reject the hypothesis of lack of
association between violations of Condorcet Consistency in choices over two and
three period sequences (the exact mid-p value for the Fisher test is 0.002) - in short,
we can reject the hypothesis that violations are due to random mistakes.
• Within treatment: HYP. For the HYP treatment the proportion of subjects violating
Condorcet Consistency falls slightly from 25% to 21.4% as sequence length increases,
but this digerence is not statistically signiﬁcant (the exact p-value of the McNemar
test is 0.407). In addition, we cannot reject the hypothesis of lack of association
between violations of Condorcet Consistency in choices over two and three period
sequences (the exact mid-p value for the Fisher test is 0.237) - in short, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that violations are due to random mistakes.
• Across treatment: two period sequences. Comparing across treatments we note that
for the two period sequences the percentage of violations of Condorcet Consistency
falls when moving from the PAY (38.2%) to the HYP (25%) treatment, and this
digerence is statistically signiﬁcant (Fisher test yields an exact mid-p value of 0.047);
• Across treatment: three period sequences. Comparing across treatments we note that
for the three period sequences the percentage of violations of Condorcet consistency
falls when moving from the PAY (29.4%%) to the HYP (21.4%) treatment, and this




3p e r i o d s 3p e r i o d s
× X × X
# % # % # % # %
2p e r i o d s × 2 1.9 10 9.9 2 3.6 1 1.8
X 5 4.9 85 83.3 1 1.8 52 92.8
Table 14: Violations of Pairwise Consistency for digerent sequence length.
• Within treatment: PAY. For the PAY treatment, the proportion of subjects violating
Pairwise Consistency falls from 11.8% to 6.8% as sequence length increases, but this
digerence is not statistically signiﬁcant (the exact p-value for the McNemar test is
0.151). In addition, we cannot reject the hypothesis of lack of association between
violations of Pairwise Consistency in choicess over two and three period sequences
(the exact mid-p value for the Fisher test is 0.113) - in short, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that violations are due to random mistakes.
• Within treatment: HYP. For the HYP treatment the proportion of subjects violating
Pairwise Consistency stays unchanged at 5.4%. In addition, we reject the hypothesis
of lack of association between violations of Pairwise Consistency in choices over two
and three period sequences (the exact mid-p value for the Fisher test is 0.003) - in
short, we reject the hypothesis that violations are due to random mistakes.
• Across treatment: two period sequences. Comparing across treatments we note that
for the two period sequences the percentage of violations of Pairwise Consistency
falls when moving from the PAY (11.8%) to the HYP (5.4%) treatment, and this
digerence is statistically signiﬁcant at 10% conﬁdence level (Fisher test yields an
exact mid-p value of 0.100);
• Across treatment: two period sequences. Comparing across treatments we note that
for the three period sequences the percentage of violations of Pairwise Consistency
falls when moving from the PAY (6.9%) to the HYP (5.4%) treatment, and this
digerence is not statistically signiﬁcant (Fisher test yields an exact mid-p value of
0.375).
WARP
• Within treatment: PAY. For the PAY treatment, the proportion of subjects violating
WARP falls from 42.1% to 29.4% as sequence length increases, and this digerence
is statistically signiﬁcant (the exact p-value for the McNemar test is 0.020). In
addition, we reject the hypothesis of lack of association between violations of WARP
in choices over two and three period sequences (the exact mid-p value for the Fisher
test is 0.003) - in short, we can reject the hypothesis that violations are due to
random mistakes.
26PAY HYP
3p e r i o d s 3p e r i o d s
× X × X
# % # % # % # %
2p e r i o d s × 19 18.6 24 23.5 7 12.5 9 16.1
X 11 10.8 48 47.1 6 10.7 34 60.7
Table 15: Violations of WARP for digerent sequence length.
• Within treatment: HYP. For the HYP treatment the proportion of subjects violating
WARP falls from 28.6% to 23.2% as sequence length increases, but this digerence
i sn o ts t a t i s t i c a l l ys i g n i ﬁ c a n t( t h ee x a c tp - v a l u eo ft h eM c N e m a rt e s ti s0 .304). In
addition, we reject the hypothesis of lack of association between violations of WARP
in choices over two and three period sequences (the exact mid-p value for the Fisher
test is 0.017) - in short, we reject the hypothesis that violations are due to random
mistakes.
• Across treatment: two period sequences. Comparing across treatments we note that
for the two period sequences the percentage of violations of WARP falls when mov-
ing from the PAY (42.1%) to the HYP (28.6%) treatment, and this digerence is
statistically signiﬁcant (Fisher test yields an exact mid-p value of 0.047);
• Across treatment: three period sequences. Comparing across treatments we note
that for the three period sequences the percentage of violations of WARP falls when
moving from the PAY (29.4%) to the HYP (23.2%) treatment, but this digerence
is not statistically signiﬁcant (Fisher test yields an exact mid-p value of 0.206).
Expansion
PAY HYP
3p e r i o d s 3p e r i o d s
× X × X
# % # % # % # %
2p e r i o d s × 18 17.6 21 20.6 5 8.9 9 16.1
X 12 11.8 51 50 8 14.3 34 60.7
Table 16: Violations of Expansion for digerent sequence length.
• Within treatment: PAY. For the PAY treatment, the proportion of subjects violating
Expansion falls from 38.2% to 29.4% as sequence length increases, and this digerence
is statistically signiﬁcant at 10% conﬁdence level (the exact p-value for the McNemar
test is 0.081). In addition, we reject the hypothesis of lack of association between
violations of Expansion in choices over two and three period sequences (the exact
m i d - pv a l u ef o rt h eF i s h e rt e s ti s0 .002) - in short, we can reject the hypothesis that
violations are due to random mistakes.
27• Within treatment: HYP. For the HYP treatment the proportion of subjects violating
Expansion falls from 25% to 23.2% as sequence length increases, but this digerence
is not statistically signiﬁcant (the exact p-value of the McNemar test is 0.5). In
addition, we cannot reject the hypothesis of lack of association between violations
of Expansion in choices over two and three period sequences (the exact mid-p value
f o rt h eF i s h e rt e s ti s0 .117) - in short, we cannot reject the hypothesis that violations
are due to random mistakes.
• Across treatment: two period sequences. Comparing across treatments we note that
for the two period sequences the percentage of violations of Expansion falls when
moving from the PAY (38.2%) to the HYP (25%) treatment, and this digerence is
statistically signiﬁcant (Fisher test yields an exact mid-p value of 0.047);
• Across treatment: three period sequences. Comparing across treatments we note that
for the three period sequences the percentage of violations of Expansion falls when
moving from the PAY (29.4%) to the HYP (23.2%) treatment, but this digerence
is not statistically signiﬁcant (Fisher test yields an exact mid-p value of 0.206).
WARP*
PAY HYP
3p e r i o d s 3p e r i o d s
× X × X
# % # % # % # %
2p e r i o d s × 5 4.9 17 16.7 3 5.4 3 5.4
X 7 6.8 73 71.6 2 3.6 48 85.6
Table 17: Violations of WARP* for digerent sequence length.
• Within treatment: PAY. For the PAY treatment, the proportion of subjects violating
WARP* falls from 21.6% to 11.7% as sequence length increases, and this digerence
is statistically signiﬁcant (the exact p-value for the McNemar test is 0.032). In
addition, we can reject at 10% conﬁdence level the hypothesis of lack of association
between violations of WARP* in choices over two and three period sequences (the
exact mid-p value for the Fisher test is 0.051) - in short, we can reject the hypothesis
that violations are due to random mistakes.
• Within treatment: HYP. For the HYP treatment the proportion of subjects violat-
ing WARP* falls from 10.8% to 9% as sequence length increases, but this digerence
is not statistically signiﬁcant (the exact p-value of the McNemar test is 0.5). In ad-
dition, we reject the hypothesis of lack of association between violations of WARP*
in choices over two and three period sequences (the exact mid-p value for the Fisher
test is 0.003) - in short, we reject the hypothesis that violations are due to random
mistakes.
28• Across treatment: two period sequences. Comparing across treatments we note that
for the two period sequences the percentage of violations fof WARP* alls when
moving from the PAY (21.6%) to the HYP (10.8%) treatment, and this digerence
is statistically signiﬁcant (Fisher test yields an exact mid-p value of 0.045);
• Across treatment: three period sequences. Comparing across treatments we note that
for the two period sequences the percentage of violations of WARP* falls slightly
when moving from the PAY (11.7%) to the HYP (9%) treatment, and this digerence
is statistically signiﬁcant (Fisher test yields an exact mid-p value of 0.298).
Based on tables 16-17 we can summarize the overall violations of the axioms considered
by experimental subject:
PAY HYP
# % # %
Condorcet Consistency 51 50 22 39.3
Expansion 51 50 22 39.3
WARP* 29 28.4 8 14.4
Pairwise Consistency 17 16.7 4 7.2
WARP 54 52.9 22 39.3
Table 18: Overall axiom violations.
whereas the outcome of the various tests are summarized in table 8 in the main text.
A.2 Failures of Rational Shortlist Methods by sequence length
We report in tables 19 and 20 the crosstabulation of violations of Expansion and WARP*
for each choice function in each treatment:
Rational Shortlist Methods: PAY
Expansion Expansion
× X × X
# % # % # % # %
WARP* × 22 21.6 0 0 12 11.8 0 0 × WARP*
X 17 16.7 63 61.7 18 17.6 72 70.6 X
Two period sequences Three period sequences
Table 19: Violations of WARP* and Expansion by sequence length, PAY treatment
In addition, we also distinguish more ﬁnely the number of subjects which violate which
axioms in which choice function in tables 21 and 22. In this way we can see that, although
there is no theoretical reason for this to happen, the fact that violations of WARP* imply
violations of Expansion is an empirical regularity.
29Rational Shortlist Methods: HYP
Expansion Expansion
× X × X
# % # % # % # %
WARP* × 6 10.7 0 0 5 14.3 0 0 × WARP*
X 8 14.3 42 75 8 8.9 43 76.8 X
Two period sequences Three period sequences
Table 20: Violations of WARP* and Expansion by sequence length, HYP treatment
Rational Shortlist Methods: PAY
2\3$ both violated EXP only WARP* only none
& # % # % # % # %
both violated 5 4.9 8 7.8 0 0 9 8.8
EXP only 3 2.9 2 1.9 0 0 12 11.8
WARP* only 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
none violated 4 3.9 8 7.8 0 0 51 50
Table 21: Violations of the axioms characterising RSM by sequence length - PAY.
Rational Shortlist Methods: HYP
2\3$ both violated EXP only WARP* only none
& # % # % # % # %
both violated 3 5.4 0 0 0 0 3 5.4
EXP only 0 0 2 3.6 0 0 6 10.7
WARP* only 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
none violated 2 3.6 6 10.7 0 0 34 60.6
Table 22: Violations of the axioms characterising RSM by sequence length - HYP.
30A.3 Instructions
Please note: you are not allowed to communicate with the other participants for the entire
duration of the experiment.
The instructions are the same for all you. You are taking part in an experiment to
study intertemporal preferences. The project is ﬁnanced by the ESRC.
Shortly you will see on your screen a series of displays. Each display contains various
remuneration plans worth the same total amount of 48 Euros each, staggered in three, six
and nine months installments. For every display you will have to select the plan that you
prefer, clicking on the button with the letter corresponding to the chosen plan. (HYP:
These remuneration plans are purely hypothetical. At the end of the experiment you’ll
be given a participation fee of 5 Euros.) (PAY: At the end of the experiment one of the
displays will be drawn at random and the your remuneration will be made according to
the plan you have chosen in that display).
In order to familiarize yourself with the way the plans will be presented on the screen,




3 Euros in one year
1E u r o i nt w oy e a r s
1 Euro in three years
2E u r o i nf o u ry e a r s
Plan B
How much When
1E u r o i no n ey e a r
2E u r o s i nt w oy e a r s
3 Euros in three years
1E u r o i nf o u ry e a r s
In this example plan A yields 7 Euros in total in installments of 3 Euros, 1 Euro, 1
Euro and 2 Euros in a year, two years, three years and four years from now, respectively,
while plan B yields 7 Euros in total in installments of 1 Euro, 2 Euros, 3 Euros and 1
Euro in a year, two years, three years and four years from now, respectively.
31A.4 Raw Data
We describe below the variable names used in Table 23:
T: treatment (0 for PAY and 1 for HYP)
SS: session number
SB: subject number
SX: subject’s sex (F for Female and M for Male)
Choices between plans are coded as follows: abcdn indicates the choice between plans a, b, c and d of length n periods. A
value of 1, 2, 3 or 4 indicates that a, b, c or d, respectively, was chosen. Similar for choices abcn (involving three plans only) and
abn (involving two plans only).
T SS SB SX ki3 id3 dk3 ij3 jk3 jd3 kid3 jki3 djk3 idj3 kidj3 ki2 id2 dk2 ij2 jk2 jd2 kid2 jki2 djk2 idj2 kidj2
0 1 0 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 1 1 F 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 3 4
0 1 2 F 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 3 3 1 1
0 1 3 F 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 1
0 1 4 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 1 5 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1
0 1 6 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 1 7 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 1 8 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 1 9 F 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 4 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 2 3 4
0 2 0 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 2 1 F 2 2 1 1 1 2 3 3 1 2 4 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1
0 2 2 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 2 3 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 2 4 M 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1
0 2 5 F 1 1 2 1 2 2 3 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1
0 2 6 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 2 7 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 2 8 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
320 2 9 M 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 3 3 1 2
0 2 10 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 2 11 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 3 3
0 2 12 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 2 13 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 2 14 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 2 15 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 3 0 M 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 1 1
0 3 1 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 3 2 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 3 2 3
0 3 3 F 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1
0 3 4 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1
0 3 5 M 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 3 6 F 1 2 2 1 1 2 3 2 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 3
0 3 7 F 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 3
0 3 8 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 4 0 F 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1
0 4 1 M 1 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 1 2 4 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 4 2 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 4 3 M 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1
0 4 4 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 4 5 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 4 6 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 4 7 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 4 8 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 4 9 M 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 3 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 1
0 4 10 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 4 11 F 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 3 3 1 3
0 5 0 F 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 3 1 3 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 1 3 1
0 5 1 F 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 3 2 1 4
330 5 2 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 5 3 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 5 4 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 1
0 5 5 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 5 6 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 3 1 2 3
0 5 7 F 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 3 1 2
0 6 0 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 1 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 6 1 M 1 2 1 2 1 1 3 1 2 2 4 2 2 1 2 1 2 3 1 1 2 3
0 6 2 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 2 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 6 3 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 6 4 M 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 3 1 1
0 6 5 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 6 6 M 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 3 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 3 2 1 3 1
0 6 7 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 6 8 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 6 9 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 6 10 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 2 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 6 11 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 3 2 3
0 7 0 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 7 1 F 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1
0 7 2 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 7 3 F 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 1
0 7 4 F 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 3
0 7 5 M 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1
0 7 6 F 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 3 2 1
0 7 7 F 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1
0 7 8 F 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 3 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 3 3 1 2
0 7 9 M 1 2 2 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 7 10 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 7 11 M 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 3 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
340 8 0 M 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 4 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 3 4
0 8 1 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 8 2 M 1 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 4
0 8 3 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 8 4 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 8 5 M 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 2 2 2 1 3 2 1 2 4
0 8 6 F 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1
0 8 7 M 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 3
0 8 8 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 8 9 M 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 3
0 8 10 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 9 0 M 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 3 3 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 2 3 2 1
0 9 1 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 9 2 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 9 3 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 9 4 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
0 9 5 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 2 1
0 9 6 F 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 3 1 4
0 9 7 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 3 2 3 2 1
0 9 8 M 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 3 1 1
0 9 9 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 3 2 3
0 9 10 F 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1
0 9 11 M 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 3 3 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 3 3 1
1 1 0 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 1 1 F 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 1
1 1 2 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 1 3 F 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 1
1 1 4 F 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1
1 1 5 F 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1
1 1 6 M 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 3 3 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 3 3 1 2
351 1 7 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 3 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1
1 1 8 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 1 9 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 1 10 F 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1
1 1 12 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 1 13 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 1 14 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 1 15 F 1 2 2 1 2 2 3 2 3 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 2 0 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 2 1 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 2 2 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 2 3 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 2 4 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 2 5 M 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 3 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 3 3 3 2 3
1 2 6 M 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 1
1 2 7 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1
1 2 8 M 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 3 1 2
1 2 9 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 2 10 F 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 3 0 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 3 1 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 3 2 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 3
1 3 3 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 3 4 M 2 2 1 1 1 2 3 3 1 2 3 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 1
1 3 5 F 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 3 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 2 1
1 3 6 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 3 7 F 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 4 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 4
1 3 8 M 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 3
1 3 9 M 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 2
1 3 10 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
361 3 11 F 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1
1 3 12 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 2
1 3 13 M 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 3 3 1 3 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2
1 3 14 F 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 1
1 3 15 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 4 0 M 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 4 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 3 1 2
1 4 1 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 4 2 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 4 3 M 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 1
1 4 4 F 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 3 3 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 1 3 2
1 4 5 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 4 6 M 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 3 1
1 4 7 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 3 2 3
1 4 8 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 3
1 4 9 M 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1
1 4 10 M 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 3
1 4 11 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 4 12 F 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 4 13 M 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
Table 23: Raw data.
37A.5 Frequency distribution of choice proﬁles
Below we present the frequency distribution for the choice functions we have observed
with both two and three period sequences (Tables 24 and 25).

























































Table 24: Frequency distribution of choice functions for
two period sequences.

















































Table 25: Frequency distribution of choice functions for
three period sequences.
How should one read the tables? Because it would be impractical to list all the 20,736
possible choice functions, we divide them in two additional tables below, providing ﬁrst
the codes for all 64 possible binary choices (Table 26), and then all 324 possible choices out
of the non-binary sets (Table 27). The codes in the frequency tables 24 and 25 of choice
functions are in the format XX-YYY, where XX is the code of proﬁles for binary choices
and YYY is the code for choice proﬁles out of non binary sets. For instance, consider
the modal choice proﬁle in both tables, 51-195. From Table 26 proﬁle 51 corresponds
to KI =0 ,ID =1 ,DK =0 ,IJ =0 ,JK =1a n dJD =1 ,w h i l ef r o mT a b l e2 7
proﬁle 195 corresponds to KID =3 ,JKI =2 ,DJK =1 ,IDJ =2 ,KIDJ =3 .T h u s
the corresponding choice function is  ({K,I})=K,  ({I,D})=D,  ({D,K})=D,
 ({I,J})=I,  ({J,K})=K,  ({J,D})=D,  ({K,I,D})=D,  ({J,K,I})=K,
 ({D,J,K})=D and  ({K,I,D,J})=D.
proﬁle of binary choices KI ID DK IJ JK JD
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 1 0 0 0 0
4 1 1 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 1 0 0 0
6 1 0 1 0 0 0
7 0 1 1 0 0 0
8 1 1 1 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 1 0 0
10 1 0 0 1 0 0
11 0 1 0 1 0 0
12 1 1 0 1 0 0
13 0 0 1 1 0 0
14 1 0 1 1 0 0
15 0 1 1 1 0 0
16 1 1 1 1 0 0
4117 0 0 0 0 1 0
18 1 0 0 0 1 0
19 0 1 0 0 1 0
20 1 1 0 0 1 0
21 0 0 1 0 1 0
22 1 0 1 0 1 0
23 0 1 1 0 1 0
24 1 1 1 0 1 0
25 0 0 0 1 1 0
26 1 0 0 1 1 0
27 0 1 0 1 1 0
28 1 1 0 1 1 0
29 0 0 1 1 1 0
30 1 0 1 1 1 0
31 0 1 1 1 1 0
32 1 1 1 1 1 0
33 0 0 0 0 0 1
34 1 0 0 0 0 1
35 0 1 0 0 0 1
36 1 1 0 0 0 1
37 0 0 1 0 0 1
38 1 0 1 0 0 1
39 0 1 1 0 0 1
40 1 1 1 0 0 1
41 0 0 0 1 0 1
42 1 0 0 1 0 1
43 0 1 0 1 0 1
44 1 1 0 1 0 1
45 0 0 1 1 0 1
46 1 0 1 1 0 1
47 0 1 1 1 0 1
48 1 1 1 1 0 1
49 0 0 0 0 1 1
50 1 0 0 0 1 1
51 0 1 0 0 1 1
52 1 1 0 0 1 1
53 0 0 1 0 1 1
54 1 0 1 0 1 1
55 0 1 1 0 1 1
56 1 1 1 0 1 1
57 0 0 0 1 1 1
58 1 0 0 1 1 1
59 0 1 0 1 1 1
4260 1 1 0 1 1 1
61 0 0 1 1 1 1
62 1 0 1 1 1 1
63 0 1 1 1 1 1
64 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 26: Possible proﬁles in binary choice.
proﬁle KID JKI DJK IDJ KIDJ
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 1 1 1 1
3 3 1 1 1 1
4 1 2 1 1 1
5 2 2 1 1 1
6 3 2 1 1 1
7 1 3 1 1 1
8 2 3 1 1 1
9 3 3 1 1 1
10 1 1 2 1 1
11 2 1 2 1 1
12 3 1 2 1 1
13 1 2 2 1 1
14 2 2 2 1 1
15 3 2 2 1 1
16 1 3 2 1 1
17 2 3 2 1 1
18 3 3 2 1 1
19 1 1 3 1 1
20 2 1 3 1 1
21 3 1 3 1 1
22 1 2 3 1 1
23 2 2 3 1 1
24 3 2 3 1 1
25 1 3 3 1 1
26 2 3 3 1 1
27 3 3 3 1 1
28 1 1 1 2 1
29 2 1 1 2 1
30 3 1 1 2 1
31 1 2 1 2 1
32 2 2 1 2 1
33 3 2 1 2 1
34 1 3 1 2 1
4335 2 3 1 2 1
36 3 3 1 2 1
37 1 1 2 2 1
38 2 1 2 2 1
39 3 1 2 2 1
40 1 2 2 2 1
41 2 2 2 2 1
42 3 2 2 2 1
43 1 3 2 2 1
44 2 3 2 2 1
45 3 3 2 2 1
46 1 1 3 2 1
47 2 1 3 2 1
48 3 1 3 2 1
49 1 2 3 2 1
50 2 2 3 2 1
51 3 2 3 2 1
52 1 3 3 2 1
53 2 3 3 2 1
54 3 3 3 2 1
55 1 1 1 3 1
56 2 1 1 3 1
57 3 1 1 3 1
58 1 2 1 3 1
59 2 2 1 3 1
60 3 2 1 3 1
61 1 3 1 3 1
62 2 3 1 3 1
63 3 3 1 3 1
64 1 1 2 3 1
65 2 1 2 3 1
66 3 1 2 3 1
67 1 2 2 3 1
68 2 2 2 3 1
69 3 2 2 3 1
70 1 3 2 3 1
71 2 3 2 3 1
72 3 3 2 3 1
73 1 1 3 3 1
74 2 1 3 3 1
75 3 1 3 3 1
76 1 2 3 3 1
77 2 2 3 3 1
4478 3 2 3 3 1
79 1 3 3 3 1
80 2 3 3 3 1
81 3 3 3 3 1
82 1 1 1 1 2
83 2 1 1 1 2
84 3 1 1 1 2
85 1 2 1 1 2
86 2 2 1 1 2
87 3 2 1 1 2
88 1 3 1 1 2
89 2 3 1 1 2
90 3 3 1 1 2
91 1 1 2 1 2
92 2 1 2 1 2
93 3 1 2 1 2
94 1 2 2 1 2
95 2 2 2 1 2
96 3 2 2 1 2
97 1 3 2 1 2
98 2 3 2 1 2
99 3 3 2 1 2
100 1 1 3 1 2
101 2 1 3 1 2
102 3 1 3 1 2
103 1 2 3 1 2
104 2 2 3 1 2
105 3 2 3 1 2
106 1 3 3 1 2
107 2 3 3 1 2
108 3 3 3 1 2
109 1 1 1 2 2
110 2 1 1 2 2
111 3 1 1 2 2
112 1 2 1 2 2
113 2 2 1 2 2
114 3 2 1 2 2
115 1 3 1 2 2
116 2 3 1 2 2
117 3 3 1 2 2
118 1 1 2 2 2
119 2 1 2 2 2
120 3 1 2 2 2
45121 1 2 2 2 2
122 2 2 2 2 2
123 3 2 2 2 2
124 1 3 2 2 2
125 2 3 2 2 2
126 3 3 2 2 2
127 1 1 3 2 2
128 2 1 3 2 2
129 3 1 3 2 2
130 1 2 3 2 2
131 2 2 3 2 2
132 3 2 3 2 2
133 1 3 3 2 2
134 2 3 3 2 2
135 3 3 3 2 2
136 1 1 1 3 2
137 2 1 1 3 2
138 3 1 1 3 2
139 1 2 1 3 2
140 2 2 1 3 2
141 3 2 1 3 2
142 1 3 1 3 2
143 2 3 1 3 2
144 3 3 1 3 2
145 1 1 2 3 2
146 2 1 2 3 2
147 3 1 2 3 2
148 1 2 2 3 2
149 2 2 2 3 2
150 3 2 2 3 2
151 1 3 2 3 2
152 2 3 2 3 2
153 3 3 2 3 2
154 1 1 3 3 2
155 2 1 3 3 2
156 3 1 3 3 2
157 1 2 3 3 2
158 2 2 3 3 2
159 3 2 3 3 2
160 1 3 3 3 2
161 2 3 3 3 2
162 3 3 3 3 2
163 1 1 1 1 3
46164 2 1 1 1 3
165 3 1 1 1 3
166 1 2 1 1 3
167 2 2 1 1 3
168 3 2 1 1 3
169 1 3 1 1 3
170 2 3 1 1 3
171 3 3 1 1 3
172 1 1 2 1 3
173 2 1 2 1 3
174 3 1 2 1 3
175 1 2 2 1 3
176 2 2 2 1 3
177 3 2 2 1 3
178 1 3 2 1 3
179 2 3 2 1 3
180 3 3 2 1 3
181 1 1 3 1 3
182 2 1 3 1 3
183 3 1 3 1 3
184 1 2 3 1 3
185 2 2 3 1 3
186 3 2 3 1 3
187 1 3 3 1 3
188 2 3 3 1 3
189 3 3 3 1 3
190 1 1 1 2 3
191 2 1 1 2 3
192 3 1 1 2 3
193 1 2 1 2 3
194 2 2 1 2 3
195 3 2 1 2 3
196 1 3 1 2 3
197 2 3 1 2 3
198 3 3 1 2 3
199 1 1 2 2 3
200 2 1 2 2 3
201 3 1 2 2 3
202 1 2 2 2 3
203 2 2 2 2 3
204 3 2 2 2 3
205 1 3 2 2 3
206 2 3 2 2 3
47207 3 3 2 2 3
208 1 1 3 2 3
209 2 1 3 2 3
210 3 1 3 2 3
211 1 2 3 2 3
212 2 2 3 2 3
213 3 2 3 2 3
214 1 3 3 2 3
215 2 3 3 2 3
216 3 3 3 2 3
217 1 1 1 3 3
218 2 1 1 3 3
219 3 1 1 3 3
220 1 2 1 3 3
221 2 2 1 3 3
222 3 2 1 3 3
223 1 3 1 3 3
224 2 3 1 3 3
225 3 3 1 3 3
226 1 1 2 3 3
227 2 1 2 3 3
228 3 1 2 3 3
229 1 2 2 3 3
230 2 2 2 3 3
231 3 2 2 3 3
232 1 3 2 3 3
233 2 3 2 3 3
234 3 3 2 3 3
235 1 1 3 3 3
236 2 1 3 3 3
237 3 1 3 3 3
238 1 2 3 3 3
239 2 2 3 3 3
240 3 2 3 3 3
241 1 3 3 3 3
242 2 3 3 3 3
243 3 3 3 3 3
244 1 1 1 1 4
245 2 1 1 1 4
246 3 1 1 1 4
247 1 2 1 1 4
248 2 2 1 1 4
249 3 2 1 1 4
48250 1 3 1 1 4
251 2 3 1 1 4
252 3 3 1 1 4
253 1 1 2 1 4
254 2 1 2 1 4
255 3 1 2 1 4
256 1 2 2 1 4
257 2 2 2 1 4
258 3 2 2 1 4
259 1 3 2 1 4
260 2 3 2 1 4
261 3 3 2 1 4
262 1 1 3 1 4
263 2 1 3 1 4
264 3 1 3 1 4
265 1 2 3 1 4
266 2 2 3 1 4
267 3 2 3 1 4
268 1 3 3 1 4
269 2 3 3 1 4
270 3 3 3 1 4
271 1 1 1 2 4
272 2 1 1 2 4
273 3 1 1 2 4
274 1 2 1 2 4
275 2 2 1 2 4
276 3 2 1 2 4
277 1 3 1 2 4
278 2 3 1 2 4
279 3 3 1 2 4
280 1 1 2 2 4
281 2 1 2 2 4
282 3 1 2 2 4
283 1 2 2 2 4
284 2 2 2 2 4
285 3 2 2 2 4
286 1 3 2 2 4
287 2 3 2 2 4
288 3 3 2 2 4
289 1 1 3 2 4
290 2 1 3 2 4
291 3 1 3 2 4
292 1 2 3 2 4
49293 2 2 3 2 4
294 3 2 3 2 4
295 1 3 3 2 4
296 2 3 3 2 4
297 3 3 3 2 4
298 1 1 1 3 4
299 2 1 1 3 4
300 3 1 1 3 4
301 1 2 1 3 4
302 2 2 1 3 4
303 3 2 1 3 4
304 1 3 1 3 4
305 2 3 1 3 4
306 3 3 1 3 4
307 1 1 2 3 4
308 2 1 2 3 4
309 3 1 2 3 4
310 1 2 2 3 4
311 2 2 2 3 4
312 3 2 2 3 4
313 1 3 2 3 4
314 2 3 2 3 4
315 3 3 2 3 4
316 1 1 3 3 4
317 2 1 3 3 4
318 3 1 3 3 4
319 1 2 3 3 4
320 2 2 3 3 4
321 3 2 3 3 4
322 1 3 3 3 4
323 2 3 3 3 4
324 3 3 3 3 4
Table 27: Possible proﬁles in non-binary choice sets.
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